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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of audit committee size and audit committee independence on environmental 
disclosure of non-finance service companies listed in Nigeria. Extant literature on this topic is more in developed 
countries where legal regulatory framework exists. There are limited empirical studies in developing countries 
like Nigeria that examine the effect audit committee size and independence on environmental disclosure, 
measured with Global Reporting Initiative checklist and their results have wide variant. Secondary data were 
collected from the annual reports of the sampled companies. 58 companies out of the population of 89 listed non-
financial companies in Nigeria were sampled out. Descriptive statistics and multiple regression were employed 
for analysis. The study finds that the direct effect of audit committee size and audit committee independence on 
environmental disclosure is insignificant with probability values of 0.154 and 0.107, respectively. However, 
when moderated by audit committee share ownership, the effect of audit committee size on environmental 
disclosure of the sampled companies become significant with Probability value of 0.049. This finding suggests 
that audit committee size has positive and significant effect on environmental disclosure of non-finance 
companies listed in Nigeria where members of audit committee has shares in the company.  Based on the 
findings, the study recommends that regulatory authorities should encourage companies to select members of 
audit committee with share ownership in the companies because it influences the effect of AC size on 
environmental disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
Growing public awareness about the role of companies in environmental change has drawn the attention of many 
stakeholders. These concerns, put firms under intense pressure to work in an environmentally responsible ways 
and thus called upon to disclose information about their environmental performance (Iwata & Okada, 2011; 
Ribeiro & Aibar-Guzman, 2010). Companies are demanded to operate responsibly in order to protect the 
environment from the negative impact of business activities. Environmental disclosure refers to the process of 
communicating the environmental impacts of business activities to the various stakeholders. Environmental 
Disclosure also means provision of information about operational performance of companies that affect the 
environment, to different stakeholder groups  
The need for companies to behave responsibly and accountable to the environment, necessitates 
governments and stock markets in both developed and developing countries to establish regulations to enhance 
environmental responsibility. Despite the fact in many jurisdictions companies voluntarily disclose information 
about the impacts of their operational activities on the environment, corporate ability to meet the information 
needs of various stakeholders remains questionable. The quality of environmental information disclosed is 
essential to enable stakeholders make accurate and reasonable evaluation of performance and take appropriate 
action (Global Reporting Initiative, GRI, 2013). Companies are therefore, under immense pressure to improve 
the quality of environmental information they disclose. The need therefore, exist to identify the factors that 
influence managers' decisions pertaining disclosure and to apply these factors to predict disclosure levels and 
improve the quality of environmental information. Rupley, Brown and Marshal (2012) stated that effective 
monitoring mechanisms can encourage management to act in the best interests of the various stakeholders. Good 
corporate governance is an effective monitoring mechanism put in place to improve transparency and 
accountability in information disclosure practice in companies. Audit committee is one of such monitoring 
mechanisms.  
 Audit committee (AC) is a sub-committee of the Board that specializes in, and is responsible for, ensuring 
the accuracy and reliability of the financial statements provided by management (Kuang, 2007). In Nigeria, 
section 359 (6) of the Companies and Allied Matters Acts CAMA (2020), as amended, provides that the 
functions of audit committee are to review the audited and unaudited financial statements as well as other special 
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investigation of the company in accordance with the legal requirement and agreed ethical practices. The act also 
requires audit committee to ensure that the company maintains effective system of accounting and internal 
control as well as to review the scope and results of external auditors thereby reaffirming their objectivity. 
Similarly, AC reviews risk management systems, including risk associated with corporate environmental 
responsibility issues, on an annual basis. AC is expected to challenge management on key sustainability and 
significant reporting issues such as the clarity and completeness of disclosure contained within the annual report 
(Smith, 2003), and evaluate how the company is incorporating them to suit its own business strategy and 
governance objective (KPMG, 2010). It has also been argued that effective AC is essential for corporate 
governance to be effective (Zaman, Hudaib & Haniffa, 2011). Presence of AC brings accounting skills and 
experience to bear for corporate governance to have a positive and important influence on social and 
environmental disclosures. 
In the same vein, AC is best known for error reduction and insistence for regulatory compliance and hence, 
enhances internal control and improves disclosure quality (Ho & Wong, 2001). The UK Corporate Governance 
Code recommends that AC should consist of 6 financially literate members and at least one should be a financial 
expert (FRC, 2010). The financial expert is to assure quality of financial reporting and the credibility of 
information provided to the market (Smith, 2003). The size of audit committee and level of independence 
exercised by members of audit committee are factors that could influence the quality of environmental 
information disclosed by a company. 
Significant number of research on environmental disclosure as a function of corporate governance 
disclosure has been conducted especially in countries where effective legal/regulatory frameworks exist (Isukul 
& John, 2017). However, research on factors responsible for environmental disclosure has been few in 
developing countries, like Nigeria (Ndukwe, Dibial & Onwuchekwa, 2015; Utile, Tarbo & Ikiya, 2017; Yahaya, 
2018). Again, the limited number of literature focused mainly on oil and gas companies (Ayoola & Olasanmi, 
2013).  Furthermore, audit committee as one of the characteristics of corporate governance mechanisms and 
adduced the strongest arm calls for more research as the number of literature on it has been few. The impact of 
audit committee characteristics on environmental disclosure is an area that requires many studies because of the 
duties delegated to the committee on monitoring companies’ reporting, generally. 
The study examined the effect of audit committee Size and audit committee Independence on 
environmental disclosure of non-financial companies listed in Nigeria and to find out whether audit committee 
share ownership, acting as a moderator could affect the relationship among audit committee Size, audit 
committee Independence and the environmental disclosure.  
Based on this objective, the following hypotheses are tested;  
i. Ho1: Audit Committee Size (ACS) has no significant effect on Environmental disclosure of non-
financial service companies listed in Nigeria; 
ii.  Ho2: Audit Committee Independence (ACI) has no significant effect on Environmental disclosure of 
non-financial service companies listed in Nigeria;  
iii. Ho3: AC share ownership has no significant influence on the effect of Audit Committee on 
environmental disclosure of non-finance firms listed in Nigeria. 
iv. Ho4: Share ownership of members of AC has no significant influence on the impact of ACI on 
environmental disclosure of non-finance service companies listed in Nigeria 
The study covers a period of ten (10) years from 2010 to 2019. It is expected that the result of this study 
would influence decision making by regulators and policy maker such as Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (FEPA), Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal 
Ministry of Environment. Besides, the study contributes to the limited body of literature on the effect of AC size 
and AC independence on environmental disclosure and the moderating effect of share ownership of AC 
members on the relationship between the AC characteristics and environmental disclosure of non-financial 
companies listed in Nigeria. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Environmental disclosure which is also referred to as Corporate Environmental Reporting (Buniamin, 2010), is a 
means of communicating company’s environmental performance. Environmental disclosure can also be 
explained as the process by which a company communicates information regarding the range of its 
environmental activities to a variety of Stakeholders including employees, local communities, shareholders, 
customers, government and environmental groups (Sarivudeen & Sheham, 2013). Environmental information 
disclosure in Nigeria is and it means disclosures willingly made by companies in excess of regulatory 
requirements or free choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and other information 
believed to be relevant for decision making by users of annual reports (Tashakor, 2014). Adam, Mohamed and 
Yunusa, (2016) preferred to explain environmental disclosure as a process of communicating environmental 
information about companies impact, performance and it contribution to ecologically sustainable developments, 
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in view of the broad nature and scope of the concept. 
Environmental disclosure is an important aspect of a company’s information management for external 
communication and is important to company’s survival as financial reporting. Many companies realize the value 
relevance of voluntary reporting on company business environmental performance, in addition to financial 
results. Various stakeholders are more and more interested in environmental disclosure in the same way 
shareholders are particularly interested in financial reports. An effective environmental report can help assure 
stakeholders of the company’s strategy for continued financial success without affecting environment (Banerjee, 
2002). In response to calls from various stakeholders the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (NSEC) 
in 2011 issued a Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) for listed companies that require disclosure of 
information on the nature and extent of its environmental policies and practices. The Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Commission (SEC) followed suit by releasing Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in early 2018 mandating all 
companies on the stock exchange to report on its environmental activities. 
Concept of Audit Committee. Audit committee serves as a monitoring mechanism that aims to improve 
the quality of information disclosure to the various stakeholder.  Audit committee is one of the major operating 
committees of a company's board of directors that is in charge of overseeing financial reporting and other 
information disclosure. Board of directors is required to ensure and maintain good corporate governance in 
corporations while the various board Committees which AC is one of them are set up to assist the board in 
achieving greater efficiency in the performance of its oversight functions and strengthening governance structure. 
The need for Committees is premised on the fact that for the Board to concentrate its attention on more strategic 
issues and take informed decisions there is need to form Committees that will focus spotlights on specific 
matters. Thus, Principle 11 of the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 stipulates that “to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness, the Board delegates some of its functions, duties and responsibilities to well-
structured committees without abdicating its responsibilities”.  
By delegating tasks to Committees, Board can spend the time more efficiently on strategy. At their 
discretions, committees can seek independent professional advice and call for clarifications from senior 
management in order to enrich decision making process. Committees prepare the groundwork for decision 
making and report at the subsequent Board meetings. 
Audit Committee Size. By Audit Committee size it means the number of members of audit committee. 
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (2018) state that each audit committee should consist of a substantial 
number of members relative to the board size. A larger size of audit committee generally carries more expertise 
and experience, and thus is able to raise more insights during meetings. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand 
(1999) found a positive relationship between size of audit committee and monitoring function, which leads to 
higher performance. It was argued in various literatures that if the size of a team is large, high probability exists 
that individual members may be infected by ‘crowd effect’ and be prone to follow the others’ opinion without 
giving a deeper thought on issues.  Where this happens, the audit committee members are less likely willing to 
query the potential errors in accounting reports during internal review process, which can create greater chance 
of errors passing through and be presented, subsequently (Kipkoech & Rono, 2016). Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 
(2004) found out that audit committee size is negatively related to financial reporting. Carcello and Neal (2003) 
found no association between audit committee size and financial reporting disclosure by management 
Audit Committee Independence. Audit committee independence means an AC member who has not been 
and is not currently employed by the company. AC independence also means an AC member does not do 
significant amount of business with the company on which he is serving as board member. According to Ayuso 
and Argandona (2007) the independence of the audit committee refers to "the degree to which board members 
(audit committee) is the subject of the current CEO or organization". Independent audit committee should assist 
the board fulfills its statutory and fiduciary responsibilities (Weir & Laing, 2001). It is required that the Board 
appoints AC representatives and presents them to shareholders for their approval at the annual general meeting. 
It is required that AC membership be split into an equal proportion between executive and non-executive 
directors. The idea is to ensure the independence of the committee, thereby creating more confidence in the 
board activities, enhanced financial control and more credibility to the workings of the committee in monitoring 
company’s financial reporting process (Kibiya, Che-Ahmad & Amran, 2016).  According to DeZoort, 
Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed (2002), an independent audit committee promotes the best interests of 
corporate stakeholders. Independence has been accepted as a good practice in corporate governance, but it still 
remains one of the most common variables in the audit committee research literature.  
Literature on audit Committee size and independence, and the moderating role of AC share ownership as 
they affect environmental disclosure of non-finance companies listed in Nigeria, are reviewed in this section. 
Aburaya (2012) examined the influence of audit committee independence on environmental disclosure quantity 
and quality in UK using Stakeholder-agency theory to back the study. The study used content analysis on annual 
report of 229 companies from 2004-2007.  The study employed OLS pooled regression technique to estimate the 
relationship between audit committee independence and environmental disclosure.  It was stablished that higher 
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independent directors on the audit committee influenced higher environmental disclosure quantity and quality. 
The study needs to be replicated in a developing country because it was conducted in a developed country with a 
jurisdiction distinctively different from Nigeria. Furthermore, the period covered have being overshadowed with 
series of economic, political and regulatory events. Finding by Aburaya (2012) is not different from the result 
obtained by Djuminah, Wuryani, Kurniawati, and Satyanovi (2017) who examined the effect of audit committee 
independence on environmental disclosure from organization theory perspective. The sample used consists of 57 
Indonesia, 21 Malaysia and 18 companies in Thailand. The study found that independent audit committee has a 
significant positive effect on environmental disclosure. Deficiency of this study lies in the use of short of time 
(three years) besides the fact that there are differences in terms of environmental disclosure practices among the 
three countries examined and Nigeria. 
Similarly, Li, Mangena and Pike (2012) investigated the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and intellectual capital (IC) disclosure of 100 UK listed firms. It was found that Intellectual 
Capital disclosure is positively associated with audit committee size. The mere fact that the data is cross 
sectional and the disclosure item is intellectual capital, further evidence is needed to establish nature of the 
relationship between AC size and environmental disclosure. In another study, Madi (2012) examined the 
influence of audit committee size on corporate voluntary disclosure of 292 listed Malaysian firms. It was 
reported that audit committee size are significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure. However, 
finding by Mahdi (2012) differed from that of Royaie and Ebrahimi (2015) in which they examined the impact 
of audit committee size on voluntary ethics disclosure. It was found that AC size does not influence voluntary 
disclosure. 
Appuhami and Tashakor (2017) in a study of 300 Australian firms examined the effects of audit committee 
characteristics on voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental disclosures. The study 
adopted the methods of word and sentence counts to account for environmental disclosure.  The objective of the 
study was to assess whether AC characteristics such as size, frequency of meetings, independence, independent 
chair, financial expertise and gender diversity influence voluntary CSR and environmental disclosures. The study 
found that AC size has significant and positive association with environmental disclosure at 5% and 1% level for 
word counts and sentence, respectively. The use of word and sentence counts is a mechanistic approach which 
does not reveal much evidence about quality of environmental information disclosed by the firms.  
Eyenubo, Mohamed and Ali (2017), examined the relationship between audit committee size and financial 
reporting quality in Nigeria. 189 companies were sampled and 664 years observation from the period of 2011-
2015. They adopted panel data regression and audit committee size was found positive and significant with 
financial reporting quality. Their results underscore the importance of the corporate governance recommendation 
as a mean of strengthening the monitoring and oversight role which audit committee plays in the financial 
reporting process. This study is corroborated by the findings in Suarez, Garcia, Mendez and Gutierrez (2012) 
who found that financial reporting is significantly influenced by AC size.  The weakness in both study lies in the 
fact that they were not about the effect of AC size on environmental disclosure. 
Ofoegbu, Odoemelam, and Okafor (2018) studied the influence of audit committee independence on 
environmental disclosure quantity in South Africa and Nigeria. Secondary data were obtained from annual report 
of 213 South Africa and 90 Nigeria environmentally sensitive firms for the year 2015. Content analysis was 
applied on the annual report and OLS was employed as the technique of analysis. Their findings revealed that 
audit committee independence has no significant influence on the extent of environmental disclosure of listed 
companies in both countries examined. Use of cross sectional data adoption of OLS as technique of data analysis 
were identified as some of the weaknesses of this study. Time series effect was not considered as a factor that 
could alter the results. 
Furthermore, Chariri, Januarti, Nur, and Yuyetta (2018) used cross sectional analysis in 2015 to examine 
the relationship between audit committee independence and carbon emission disclosure from agency theory 
perspective. The study took place in Nordic (of Scandinavia, Finland and Iceland) with sample of 105 companies. 
Using regression technique as tool of analysis, the study revealed that audit committee independence has a 
significant positive effect on carbon emission disclosure. Therefore, the study concluded that, the more 
independent member on the audit committee, the better the carbon emission disclosure. However, the study 
suffered some deficiencies as cross sectional data which does not cater for time effect was used instead of panel 
data. The finding of this study sharply differed from a research by Appuhami and Tashakor (2017) in which 300 
Australian listed firms were examined to find out whether or not  audit committee characteristics have significant 
effect on voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental disclosures. Appuhami and 
Tashakor (2017) revealed that AC independence has no significant effect on environmental disclosure in 
Australian companies. 
Moreso, Naseer and Rashid (2018) studied the relationship between audit committee independence and 
environmental reporting in Pakistan. Content analysis was used on 50 non-financial companies listed on Pakistan 
Stock Exchange for the year 2014-2015. The result showed that independence of audit committee has a 
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significant positive influence on the level of environmental reporting in Pakistan. The study period is two years 
which is considered to be short. The study could be improved upon by increasing the number of period covered.  
In same vein, Sheikh, Abdullah and Shah (2019) examined the effect of characteristics of audit committee on 
voluntary disclosure level in Pakistan using 150 firms. The results suggest that AC size and AC independence 
have statistically significant effect on voluntary disclosure while, other independent variables do not have any 
significant effect. Although the study is about effect of Audit Committee characteristics, the dependent variable 
(voluntary disclosure) differs from environmental disclosure, being the focus of this research. 
 
3. Methodology 
The population of the study consist of all the eighty-nine non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from January 2010 to December 2019. The firms comprise of twenty-seven consumer goods firms, 
twenty industrial goods firms, eleven health care firms, six conglomerates firms, five agricultural firms and 
twenty natural resources firms. Out of 89 non-finance companies listed in Nigeria from 2010 to 2019, 58 firms 
were sampled due to availability of data. 41 companies were filtered out based on unavailability of their annual 
reports for extraction of data, for reasons ranging from delisting, technical suspension, and lack of trading during 
the period of the study, as shown below in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Population and sample size frame__________________________________________________ 
S/N  Sector    Population  Sample 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
1  Consumer goods   27   15 
2  Industrial goods   20   13 
3  Health care   11   6 
4  Conglomerate   6   5 
5  Agriculture   5   4 
6  Natural resources   20   15 
  Total    89   58 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Source: Field work (2020) 
The choice of these sectors is influenced by the nature of their industrial production activities which are 
considered to be environmentally sensitive and prone to cause pollution Uyagu, Okpanachi, Nyor and 
Muhammad (2017). 
TABLE 2 
Variable definition and measurement 
 Variable                                        Variable Measurement                              Sources 
  Dependent Variable (DV)     
Global Environmental Index 
Drawn from Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
Measured as an index that indicates 
Total items disclosed in GRI 
components 
Daizy & Das (2014); Abusufian 
(2012); Jurica, Lady and Prillia 
(2012) Umulkher and Muganda 
(2017); Carroll (1991). 
  Independent variables(IV)     
Audit Committee Size (SZ) 
Number of Audit committee 
members 
Appuhami and Tashakor (2017); 
Madi (2012); Madi, et al, (2014); Li, 
et al (2012); Buallay and AlDhaen 
(2018); Bicer and Feneir, 2019; 
Audit committee 
Independence (IND) 
Ratio of independent audit 
committee members to the total 
number of audit committee 
members 
Chariri, et al (2018); Appuhami and 
Tashakor (2017); Al-Shaer (2013); 
Madi, et al (2014); Li. Et al (2012); 
Buallay and AlDhaen (2018) 
 
Audit committee Share 
ownership (SO) 
This was measured by the 
percentage of shares owned by 
members of audit committee 
Kusnadi, Eong, Suwardy, and Wang 
(2016) 
 Firm Size (FS) 
This is proxied using the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the firm 
Yahaya and Andow (2015), 
Habbash(2 016) 
Source: Field work (2020) 
The following models were used to examine the hypotheses of the study. 
i. GRIit = β0 + β1SZit + β2INDit + eit. 
ii. GRIit = β0 + β1SZit + β2INDit + β3FSit + eit. 
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iii. GRIit = β0 + β1SZit + β2INDit + β3SZit *SOit+ β4INDit *SOit + eit.   
iv. GRIit = β0 +β1SZit + β2INDit + β3SZit *SOit+ β4INDit *SOit + β5FSit + eit. 
Where: 
GRI = Quality of environmental disclosure measure using ‘Global Reporting Initiative’  
Β0  = Intercept 
Β1-2  = Coefficients of independent variables 
SZ  = AC Size  
IND = AC Independence  
SO = AC Share Ownership 
FS      = Firm Size 
e        = Stochastic error term or disturbance term. 
The data used in this study were collected from secondary sources. The data in respect of all the variables of 
the study was extracted from the annual reports and accounts of the sampled non- financial service companies 
quoted on the floor of Nigeria Stock Exchange. The study used Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) with a 
checklist of 34 items, to account for environmental disclosure. Several studies have used GRI as a fore-runner 
for environmental disclosure and many other sustainable reporting (Daizy & Das, 2014). This gave reason for 
GRI to be adopted for this study. The dichotomous measurement approach was used to score the disclosed items 
in order to ensure that all items are adequately represented and free from subjectivity and bias; items not 
disclosed are scored 0, while items disclosed are scored 1. Finally, the total items disclosed is divided by total 
possible items as identified by the checklist. 
For the purpose of this research, the multiple regression analysis was employed to determine whether audit 
committee size and audit committee independence significantly affect environmental disclosure of non-financial 
service companies listed in Nigeria within the period of this study. Similarly, multiple regression analysis was 
used to determine whether audit committee share ownership affect the relationship among audit committee size 
and independence and environmental disclosure of non-financial companies listed in Nigeria. Fixed Effect (FE) 
and Random Effect (RE) regression models was employed alongside the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. The FE regression model concentrates on differences within individual company. The parametric 
assumptions about coefficient on the other hand, will impose that a change in explanatory variable has the same 
effect, whether it is a change from one period to the other or a change from one individual company to the 
another (Verbeek 2000).  This means that, the effect of changes in explanatory variables will be the same for all 
units and all periods, but that the average level for one country may be different from that of another country. 
The intercept thus, captures the effects of those variables that will be peculiar to a country and expected to be 
constant overtime. The analysis was conducted using Statistics/Data Analysis Software (STATA 16). 
 
4. Data Presentation and Analysis  
This section presents the data and discusses the results of the analyses and interpretations. The descriptive 
statistics and other univariate test results are first presented and interpreted. Thereafter, the results of the panel 
data analyses, as well as those of correlation matrices and diagnostic tests are presented and interpreted as well. 
Inferences derivable from these results, as reflected in the reviewed literature, are discussed after the tests of the 
hypotheses earlier formulated by the study. The section concludes with highlights of the policy implications 
emanating from the findings. 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
Table 3 shows that environmental disclosure is a ratio where its value falls from 0 and 1 and it could also be 
expressed in percentage.  Table 3 shows that the mean environmental disclosure is 1.1% with standard deviation 
of 3.1% while minimum and maximum value is 0% and 14.71%, respectively. 1.1% average value indicates that 
average environmental disclosure quality over the period under investigation is considered relatively low. This 
may be as a result of companies not disclosing many aspects of their business operations to reduce the 
environmental impact. High deviation from mean is as a result of variation in the environmental information 
made available. 
From Table 3, Audit Committee Size (SZ) has mean value of 5.52 and standard deviation of 1.03 with 
Variable              Obs                 Mean Std. Dev.             Min            Max 
GRI 580 .011 .031 0.000 0.147 
SZ 560 5.516 1.025 2.000 9.000 
IND 560 .461 0.125 0.000 1.000 
SO 560 1.286 3.500 0.000 35.862 
FS 560 7.176 0.925 4.992 9.231 
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minimum and maximum value of 2 and 9 respectively. The wide dispersion of the standard deviation from mean 
shows that the number of audit committee members varies from company to company. The minimum value of 2 
shows that some companies are not complying with the provisions of Company and Allied Matters Act. 
Similarly, the AC independence (IND) is measured as ratio of independent non-executive members to total 
members on the committee.  Table 3 also shows the average of AC independence across the sampled firms is 
46.1% and the standard deviation is 12.5%. The standard deviation of 12.5% is far from the mean value of 
46.1% indicating divergence of the values of independence among the studied firms over the period of study. 
The minimum value of 0% shows the presence of companies with no independent non-executive directors on the 
committee while the maximum value of 100% indicates that in some companies all members of Audit 
Committee are independent non-executive directors. 
Furthermore, Table 3 shows the average Share Ownership to be 1.29 and the standard deviation to be 3.50 
with minimum and maximum values of 0.00 and 35.86, respectively. The wide range of dispersion is due to the 
difference in the involvement of the audit committee members in owning shares, among the listed companies. 
Table above shows the average Firm size of the sampled companies in Nigeria to be approximately 7 with 
standard deviation of 0.93 with minimum and maximum value of approximately 5 and 9 respectively.  
 
Diagnostic Tests 
This section presents the results from the diagnostic tests conducted, to maintain the un-biasness of the 
parameters. The diagnostic tests include: Normality test, serial correlation test, multicolinearity test, 
heteroscedasticity test and hausman specification test. In addition, the Shapiro-Wilk test for data normality was 
conducted and the result presented in Table 5, below. Under Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data, null hypothesis 
principle was used to check if the variables come from a normally distributed population (H0: the data is 
normally distributed).  
Table 4 
Data Normality Test 
Source: STATA 14 Outputs 
The results on Table 4 shows that the data does not follow normal distribution, this is due to the fact that the 
P-values of the Z-statistics are statistically significant at 99% confidence interval (1% level of significance). The 
normality assumption failure of the data means that the models require a more generalized estimator as 
suggested by Guassian theorem (1929) which say that the problem of normality in a data will not affect the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE). 
 
5.1 Serial Correlation Test Result 
Serial correlation test was conducted to find out if there exist serial correlation problem in the study and the 
result presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Serial correlation 
Model               F-Value                           Probability 
Model 1 580.601 0.000 
Model 2 586.693 0.000 
Model 3 408.261 0.000 
Model 4 415.287 0.000 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
The above result on Table 5 shows that all the 4 models suffer from serial correlation problem with 
probability value of 0.000, respectively. This also implies that the result considers the robust fixed and random 
effect as most appropriate estimator for analysis. 
 
Test for Multicolinearity 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was also conducted to ascertain the presence of multicollinearity 
problem among the explanatory variables and the result presented in Tale 6. 
 
Variable   Obs          W          V             Z                           Prob>z 
GRI 580 0.8685 50.560 9.539 0.000 
SZ 580 0.972 10.949 5.791 0.000 
IND 580 0.890 42.239 9.058 0.000 
 SO 580 0.440 215.25 12.999 0.000 
FS 580 0.984 6.054 4.357  0.000 
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Test for multicolinearity 
Variable VIF                  1/VIF 
SZ 1.61 0.621 
IND 1.00 1.000 
FS 1.61 0.621 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
Decision rule 
VIF = 1 (Not correlated) 
1 < VIF < 10 (Moderately correlated) 
VIF >=10 (Highly correlated) (By Stephanie, 2015) 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) measures how much the variance of the estimated regression coefficients is 
inflated as compared to when the predictor variables are not linearly related. The results from the Table 6 show 
that the variables do not have multicollinearity problem (no correlation between predictors) since the VIF’s are 
less than 5. The tolerance level in the above table is also within the acceptable range of 1. This shows that the 
independent variables are appropriate and well fit into the models. As shown  in  Table  6,  since  none  of  the  
VIF  value  reached  a  value  of  5,  there  is  no  problem  of  multicollinearity  among  the  included  variables  
in  the  model thus  we maintained the two variables for the purpose of estimation. 
 
Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is used to test the normality of residuals. Cameron and Trivedi decomposition of IM-test for 
Heteroskedasticity was used to test the existence of Heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity check, necessitated 
the running of fixed and random effect models for the study is as presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Test for Heteroscedascity (Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test) 
Model             chi2(1)                     Prob > chi2 
Model 1 22.72 0.000 
Model 2 88.77 0.000 
Model 3 58.22 0.000 
Model 4 143.77 0.000 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
The result on Table 7 tests the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative 
that the error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. The result show that all the  4 
models are not free from Heteroskedasticity and their variance are not equal (not Homoscedastic) with P-value 
as 0.000, respectively, which are less than 0.05 at 95% confidence interval for rejecting the null hypothesis of 
Homoskedasticity. Therefore, this study conclude that all the models are Heteroskedastic. The Breusch Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects tests for null hypothesis is, there is no panel effect (i.e. the variance 
of the random effect is zero) while its alternative hypothesis is that there is panel effect (i.e. the variance of the 
random effect is not equal to zero. The results are displayed on Table 8. 
Table 8 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Model                      chi2                                Prob > chi2 
Model 1 1770.83 0.000 
Model 2 1723.89 0.000 
Model 3 1658.92 0.000 
Model 4 1652.85 0.000 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
As shown on Table 8, the 4 models suffers from panel effect with the P-values of 0.000, less than 0.05 level 
of significant at 95% confidence interval, for accepting the null hypothesis of no panel effect. Therefore, we 
conclude that there are panel effects among the models. We therefore proceed to run Hausman Test. 
 
Hausman Specification Test Result 
Hausman Specification Test specifies the actual model that best explains the study. It helps to specify if a 
random effect model or a fixed effect model is to be run with its probability value. Hausman Specification Test 
null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effect; the alternate hypothesis is that the preferred model is 
fixed effects. If the P-value is less than 0.05, then we do not accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
preferred model is the fixed effect model. However, if the P-value is greater than 0.05 at 95% confidence interval, 
we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the preferred model is the random effect model. 
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Hausman specification test 
Model                          chi2                                       Prob > chi2 
Model 1 1.77 0.412 
Model 2 2.68 0.443 
Model 3 5.82 0.213 
Model 4 3.69 0.595 
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
From Table 9, Hausman specification test result show that 4 model are not significant with probability value 
of 0.412, 0.443, 0.213 and 0.595 respectively, which implies that a random effect model will be run for the 4 
models. 
 
Multiple Regression Result 
This section presents the regression results of the dependent variables namely; Environmental disclosure 
measured with Global Reporting Initiative, two independent variables; Audit Committee size (SZ) and Audit 
Committee Independence, one moderating variable; Share Ownership (SO) and one control variable namely; 
Firm size (FS).  
Table 10 
Regression Result 
GRI Coef. Std. Err. z P>z   [95% Conf. Interval] 
SZ .004571 .0023947 1.91 0.056 -.0001225 .0092646 
IND .0239015 .0142252 1.68 0.093 -.0039794 .0517823 
_cons -.0248724 .0174293 -1.43 0.154 -.0590331 .0092883 
       
Wald chi2(2) 4.00      
Prob > chi2 0.1353      
R-sq: 0.0846      
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
The result of the regression analysis for Model 1 revealed that the R-squared, often referred to as coefficient 
of determination of the variables, for model 1 is 0.0846, as shown on Table 10. This implies that 8.5% of the 
changes in environmental disclosure (GRI) is explained by the independent variables (Audit Committee size and 
Audit Committee Independence). This is also confirmed by the Wald Chi-Squared statistics of 4.00 whose 
probability (0.1353) implies that the independent variables combined are not good predictor of environmental 
information (they are statistically not significant). A unit change in audit committee size will increase GRI by 
0.005, though it is statistically not significant with probability 0.056 which is greater than 0.05 significant level 
at 95% confidence interval for rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant effect. Also, a unit change in audit 
committee independence will increase GRI by 0.024, and it is also not statistically significant with probability 
0.093 which is greater than 0.05 at 95% confidence interval for rejecting the null hypothesis of no statistically 
significant effect. The study contradicts the findings of Chariri, Januarti, Nur, and Yuyetta (2018) that revealed 




GRI Coef. Std. Err. z P>z   [95% Conf. Interval] 
SZ .0034832 .0024454 1.42 0.154 -.0013097 .0082761 
IND .0221601 .0137523 1.61 0.107 -.004794 .0491141 
FS .0101367 .0042923 2.36 0.018 .0017239 .0185495 
cons -.0908142 .0355917 -2.55 0.011 -.1605726 -.0210558 
Wald chi2(2) 10.07      
Prob > chi2 0.0180      
R-sq: 0.1311      
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
Table 11 also reveals that the R-squared for model 2 was found to be 0.131. This implies that 13.1% of the 
changes in GRI can be explained by the independent variable combined (Audit Committee size and Audit 
Committee Independence and the control variable, Firm size). This is also confirmed by the Wald Chi-Squared 
statistics of 10.07 whose probability (0.0180), which implies that the independent variables combined, are good 
predictor of GRI.  A unit change in audit committee size will increase GRI by 0.003, though it is statistically not 
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significant with probability 0.154 which is greater than 0.05 for rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant 
effect. Also, a unit change in audit committee independence will increase GRI by 0.022, which it is statistically 
also not significant with probability 0.107. While the introduced control variable (Firm Size) shows a positive 
and significant effect on GRI with probability value of 0.018 this is in agreement with the results obtained by 
Burgwal and Vieira (2014).  
Table 12 
Regression results 
GRI         Coef. Std. Err.          z        P>z   [95% Conf. Interval] 
SZ .0046 .0023 1.97 0.049 .0000149 .009198 
IND .0221 .0139 1.59 0.112 -.0051893 .0494308 
lnSZSO -.0015 .0027 -0.54 0.591 -.0068105 .0038767 
INDSO .0028 .0024 1.13 0.257 -.0020165 .0075478 
cons -.0213 .0171 -1.25 0.212 -.0548667 .0121793 
Wald chi2(2) 5.52      
Prob > chi2 0.2378      
R-sq: 0.0799      
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
Similarly, Table 12 also shows that the R-squared for model 3 was found to be 0.080. This implies that 8% 
of the changes in GRI can be explained by the independent variables with aid of the moderating variable, AC 
share ownership. The results of Model 3 as shown on table 13 indicate, a unit change in audit committee size 
will increase GRI by 0.005.  With probability 0.049 which is less than 0.05 significant level at 95% confidence 
interval (for not accepting the null hypothesis of no significant effect). This implies that audit committee size has 
significant effect on environmental disclosure measured by GRI. The finding corroborates the result found by 
Madi (2012) and Appuhami and Tashakor (2017) in which AC size was found to have significant positive effect, 
while AC independent does not have significant effect on environmental disclosure. However, the result differs 
from Royaie and Ebrahimi (2015) who found that AC size has no significant effect on voluntary disclosure.  
Also, a unit change in audit committee independence will increase GRI by 0.022 and it is statistically not 
significant with probability 0.112 which is greater than 0.05 significant level at 95% confidence interval for not 
rejecting the null hypothesis. Here, the introduction of the moderator (SO) account for an additional 1% change 
in the R-squared (SO account for almost 1% additional changes in GRI). The introduction of the moderator (AC 
Share Ownership) also influence the performance of AC size on GRI to be statistically significant. 
Table 13 
Regression results 
GRI      Coef. Std. Err.          z       P>z   [95% Conf. Interval] 
SZ .0034 .0024 1.45 0.147 -.001209 .0080941 
IND .0205 .0135 1.51 0.131 -.0060758 .0470003 
lnSZSO -.0008 .0027 -0.29 0.775 -.0059891 .0044666 
INDSO .0021 .0024 0.89 0.374 -.0025539 .0067968 
FS .0103 .0042 2.45 0.014 .0020783 .0186173 
cons -.0890 .0349 -2.55 0.011 -.15747 -.0204887 
Wald chi2(2) 11.94      
Prob > chi2 0.036      
R-sq: 0.121      
Source: STATA 16 Outputs 
Similarly, the results of model 4 on Table 13 reveal that the R-squared was found to be 0.121. This implies 
that 12.13% of the changes in GRI is explained by Audit Committee size and Audit Committee Independence, 
Firm Size (as control variable) and the influence of AC Share Ownership, as a moderator. This is also confirmed 
by the Wald Chi-Squared statistics of 11.94 whose probability (0.0356) implies that the independent variables 
combined are better predictors of GRI. A unit change in AC size will increase GRI by 0.003, though it is 
statistically not significant with probability 0.147, for rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant effect. This 
result contradicts that found by Sheikh, Abdullah and Shah (2019 on AC size, which revealed significant effect. 
Also, a unit change in audit committee independence will increase GRI by 0.022 and it is statistically significant 
with probability 0.131 which is greater than 0.05 significant level at 95% confidence interval for rejecting the 
null hypothesis. This is similar to the findings of Ofoegbu, Odoemelam, and Okafor (2018) and Sheikh, 
Abdullah and Shah (2019) on AC independence but differs from Aburaya (2012).  The control variable (Firm 
Size) shows a positive effect (0.009) on GRI and it is statistically significant with probability value of 0.014. The 
results also indicate that introduction of the moderator Share Ownership (SO) does not influence the relationship 
between independent variables in this model and environmental disclosure, represented by GRI. 
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5. Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations.  
The research hypotheses are to test whether or not Audit Committee size and Audit Committee Independence 
have significant effect on Environmental disclosure of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. Similarly, AC 
share ownership was introduced to find out whether or not it significantly influences the effect of independent 
AC size and independence on environmental disclosure. The result shows that audit committee size and audit 
committee independence have no significant effect on environmental disclosure without the AC share ownership, 
as a moderator. 
However, when AC share ownership was introduced as a moderator, it influenced AC size to significantly 
affect environmental disclosure. Although, introduction of Share Ownership as a good moderator influenced the 
effect AC size on environmental disclosure. The study recommends that regulatory authorities should encourage 
companies to select members of audit committee with share ownership in the companies because it influences 
the effect of AC size on environmental disclosure. 
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       _cons    -.0449966   .0081813    -5.50   0.000    -.0610653   -.0289279
         IND     .0463451   .0098754     4.69   0.000     .0269489    .0657412
          SZ     .0063441   .0012061     5.26   0.000     .0039751     .008713
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .554749388       579  .000958116   Root MSE        =    .02976
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0756
    Residual    .511048425       577  .000885699   R-squared       =    0.0788
       Model    .043700963         2  .021850482   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 577)       =     24.67
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       580
. reg GEI SZ IND
          FS          580    7.176371    .9248718     4.9916      9.231
          SO          580    1.286125    3.500245          0   35.86237
         IND          580    .4609346    .1252448          0          1
          SZ          580    5.515517    1.025462          2          9
         GEI          580    .0113562    .0309535          0      .1471
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum GEI SZ IND SO FS
(10 vars, 620 obs)
> Sheet2") firstrow
. import excel "C:\Users\Neville lamar\Downloads\Mr Kolawole Data.xlsx", sheet("
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                  Prob > F =      0.0002
                 F(3, 574) =      6.66
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of GEI
. ovtest
                                                   
               Total        98.58      8    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis        24.38      1    0.0000
            Skewness        51.48      2    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity        22.72      5    0.0004
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0004
         chi2(5)      =     22.72
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
    Mean VIF        1.00
                                    
          SZ        1.00    0.999949
         IND        1.00    0.999949
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
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         rho     .8356773   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01222286
     sigma_u    .02756407
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0248724    .006712    -3.71   0.000    -.0380277   -.0117171
         IND     .0239015    .005392     4.43   0.000     .0133334    .0344695
          SZ      .004571   .0009299     4.92   0.000     .0027484    .0063936
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(2)      =      45.20
     overall = 0.0767                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0846                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0734                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
. xtreg GEI SZ IND
                delta:  1 unit
        time variable:  Years, 2010 to 2019
       panel variable:  id (unbalanced)
. xtset id Years
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. est store fe
F test that all u_i=0: F(57, 520) = 50.89                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .83796695   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01222286
     sigma_u    .02779614
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0238394   .0057757    -4.13   0.000     -.035186   -.0124928
         IND     .0231367   .0054343     4.26   0.000     .0124608    .0338126
          SZ     .0044477   .0009541     4.66   0.000     .0025733     .006322
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1155                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(2,520)          =      20.60
     overall = 0.0767                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0845                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0734                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        580
. xtreg GEI SZ IND, fe
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1770.83
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0007598       .0275641
                       e     .0001494       .0122229
                     GEI     .0009581       .0309535
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        GEI[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.4121
                          =        1.77
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         IND      .0231367     .0239015       -.0007648        .0006771
          SZ      .0044477      .004571       -.0001234        .0002134
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. est store re
                                                                              
         rho     .8356773   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01222286
     sigma_u    .02756407
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0248724    .006712    -3.71   0.000    -.0380277   -.0117171
         IND     .0239015    .005392     4.43   0.000     .0133334    .0344695
          SZ      .004571   .0009299     4.92   0.000     .0027484    .0063936
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(2)      =      45.20
     overall = 0.0767                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0846                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0734                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
. xtreg GEI SZ IND, re
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       _cons    -.0882032   .0103443    -8.53   0.000    -.1085202   -.0678861
          FS     .0106246   .0016405     6.48   0.000     .0074026    .0138467
         IND     .0452973    .009544     4.75   0.000      .026552    .0640426
          SZ     .0004413   .0014795     0.30   0.766    -.0024646    .0033472
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .554749388       579  .000958116   Root MSE        =    .02876
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1368
    Residual    .476358702       576  .000827012   R-squared       =    0.1413
       Model    .078390685         3  .026130228   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 576)       =     31.60
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       580
. reg GEI SZ IND FS
                                                                              
         rho     .8356773   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01222286
     sigma_u    .02756407
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0248724   .0174293    -1.43   0.154    -.0590331    .0092883
         IND     .0239015   .0142252     1.68   0.093    -.0039794    .0517823
          SZ      .004571   .0023947     1.91   0.056    -.0001225    .0092646
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 58 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.1353
                                                Wald chi2(2)      =       4.00
     overall = 0.0767                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0846                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0734                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
(40 missing values generated)
. xtreg GEI SZ IND, robust re
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 . xtreg GEI SZ IND FS
                                                   
               Total       196.25     13    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis        26.72      1    0.0000
            Skewness        80.76      3    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity        88.77      9    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
         chi2(9)      =     88.77
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                 F(3, 573) =     12.11
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of GEI
. ovtest
    Mean VIF        1.41
                                    
         IND        1.00    0.999662
          SZ        1.61    0.620504
          FS        1.61    0.620485
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1723.89
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0007106       .0266565
                       e      .000146       .0120839
                     GEI     .0009581       .0309535
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        GEI[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                                                                              
         rho    .82953191   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01208392
     sigma_u    .02665647
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0908142   .0172954    -5.25   0.000    -.1247126   -.0569159
          FS     .0101367   .0024598     4.12   0.000     .0053156    .0149578
         IND     .0221601   .0053459     4.15   0.000     .0116822    .0326379
          SZ     .0034832   .0009558     3.64   0.000     .0016098    .0053565
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)      =      63.41
     overall = 0.1255                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1311                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0959                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
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         rho    .82953191   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01208392
     sigma_u    .02665647
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0908142   .0172954    -5.25   0.000    -.1247126   -.0569159
          FS     .0101367   .0024598     4.12   0.000     .0053156    .0149578
         IND     .0221601   .0053459     4.15   0.000     .0116822    .0326379
          SZ     .0034832   .0009558     3.64   0.000     .0016098    .0053565
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)      =      63.41
     overall = 0.1255                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1311                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0959                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
. xtreg GEI SZ IND FS, re
. est store fe
F test that all u_i=0: F(57, 519) = 48.13                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .8323261   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01208392
     sigma_u    .02692289
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0976517    .021233    -4.60   0.000    -.1393648   -.0559385
          FS      .011042   .0030594     3.61   0.000     .0050318    .0170523
         IND     .0210913   .0054024     3.90   0.000     .0104781    .0317044
          SZ     .0036342   .0009698     3.75   0.000      .001729    .0055394
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0837                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(3,519)          =      18.39
     overall = 0.1238                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1293                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0961                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        580
. xtreg GEI SZ IND FS, fe
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 . gen SZSO = SZ* SO
                                                                              
         rho    .82953191   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01208392
     sigma_u    .02665647
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0908142   .0355917    -2.55   0.011    -.1605726   -.0210558
          FS     .0101367   .0042923     2.36   0.018     .0017239    .0185495
         IND     .0221601   .0137523     1.61   0.107     -.004794    .0491141
          SZ     .0034832   .0024454     1.42   0.154    -.0013097    .0082761
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 58 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0180
                                                Wald chi2(3)      =      10.07
     overall = 0.1255                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1311                                         avg =       10.0
     within  = 0.0959                                         min =         10
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         58
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        580
(40 missing values generated)
. xtreg GEI SZ IND FS, robust re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.4428
                          =        2.68
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          FS       .011042     .0101367        .0009053        .0018191
         IND      .0210913     .0221601       -.0010688        .0007786
          SZ      .0036342     .0034832         .000151         .000164
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. est store re
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               Total       149.26     19    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis        27.71      1    0.0000
            Skewness        73.98      4    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity        47.58     14    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
         chi2(14)     =     47.58
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
    Mean VIF        1.38
                                    
         IND        1.02    0.977218
          SZ        1.04    0.963973
      lnSZSO        1.73    0.578171
       INDSO        1.74    0.573155
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0508343   .0100083    -5.08   0.000    -.0705004   -.0311682
       INDSO     .0001944   .0010574     0.18   0.854    -.0018833    .0022721
      lnSZSO    -.0016685   .0006976    -2.39   0.017    -.0030393   -.0002977
         IND      .055805   .0127335     4.38   0.000      .030784     .080826
          SZ     .0063401   .0015391     4.12   0.000     .0033158    .0093645
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .51574656       479  .001076715   Root MSE        =    .03129
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0907
    Residual    .465072018       475  .000979099   R-squared       =    0.0983
       Model    .050674542         4  .012668635   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 475)       =     12.94
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       480
. reg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO
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         rho    .82034856   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01308046
     sigma_u    .02795161
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0311481   .0078429    -3.97   0.000    -.0465199   -.0157764
       INDSO     .0002435   .0006339     0.38   0.701     -.000999     .001486
      lnSZSO      .000164   .0005609     0.29   0.770    -.0009353    .0012634
         IND     .0296869   .0072467     4.10   0.000     .0154836    .0438902
          SZ     .0050886   .0011545     4.41   0.000     .0028258    .0073514
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =      46.63
     overall = 0.0716                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0824                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.0922                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO
                  Prob > F =      0.0029
                 F(3, 472) =      4.73
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of GEI
. ovtest
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F test that all u_i=0: F(53, 422) = 43.32                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .82278475   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01308046
     sigma_u    .02818484
                                                                              
       _cons     -.028743   .0070892    -4.05   0.000    -.0426776   -.0148083
       INDSO     .0002302   .0006461     0.36   0.722    -.0010397    .0015002
      lnSZSO     .0003948   .0005866     0.67   0.501    -.0007583    .0015479
         IND     .0284034   .0073476     3.87   0.000      .013961    .0428457
          SZ     .0048624   .0011954     4.07   0.000     .0025127    .0072122
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0761                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(4,422)          =      10.78
     overall = 0.0622                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0688                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.0927                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO, fe
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1497.80
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0007813       .0279516
                       e     .0001711       .0130805
                     GEI     .0010767       .0328133
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        GEI[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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. est store re
                                                                              
         rho    .82034856   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01308046
     sigma_u    .02795161
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0311481   .0078429    -3.97   0.000    -.0465199   -.0157764
       INDSO     .0002435   .0006339     0.38   0.701     -.000999     .001486
      lnSZSO      .000164   .0005609     0.29   0.770    -.0009353    .0012634
         IND     .0296869   .0072467     4.10   0.000     .0154836    .0438902
          SZ     .0050886   .0011545     4.41   0.000     .0028258    .0073514
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =      46.63
     overall = 0.0716                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0824                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.0922                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO, re
. est store fe
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         rho    .82034856   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01308046
     sigma_u    .02795161
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0311481   .0201028    -1.55   0.121    -.0705488    .0082526
       INDSO     .0002435   .0008844     0.28   0.783    -.0014899    .0019769
      lnSZSO      .000164   .0006056     0.27   0.787     -.001023     .001351
         IND     .0296869   .0203033     1.46   0.144    -.0101068    .0694806
          SZ     .0050886   .0028084     1.81   0.070    -.0004158     .010593
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 54 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.3942
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =       4.09
     overall = 0.0716                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0824                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.0922                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO, robust re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.5449
                          =        3.08
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       INDSO      .0002302     .0002435       -.0000133        .0001249
      lnSZSO      .0003948      .000164        .0002307        .0001719
         IND      .0284034     .0296869       -.0012836         .001213
          SZ      .0048624     .0050886       -.0002261        .0003102
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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    Mean VIF        1.62
                                    
         IND        1.02    0.977040
          SZ        1.63    0.612075
       INDSO        1.75    0.570034
          FS        1.78    0.562536
      lnSZSO        1.89    0.529294
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0826486   .0125319    -6.60   0.000    -.1072736   -.0580237
          FS      .008223    .002004     4.10   0.000     .0042852    .0121608
       INDSO    -.0001214    .001043    -0.12   0.907    -.0021709    .0019281
      lnSZSO    -.0008128   .0007173    -1.13   0.258    -.0022222    .0005966
         IND     .0551114   .0125275     4.40   0.000      .030495    .0797277
          SZ     .0016293   .0019002     0.86   0.392    -.0021045    .0053631
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .51574656       479  .001076715   Root MSE        =    .03078
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1200
    Residual    .449118695       474  .000947508   R-squared       =    0.1292
       Model    .066627864         5  .013325573   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 474)       =     14.06
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       480
. reg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS
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         rho    .82016178   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01298005
     sigma_u    .02771949
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0909543   .0200734    -4.53   0.000    -.1302974   -.0516111
          FS     .0093205   .0028849     3.23   0.001     .0036662    .0149748
       INDSO     .0002639   .0006278     0.42   0.674    -.0009665    .0014943
      lnSZSO     .0002846   .0005567     0.51   0.609    -.0008064    .0013757
         IND     .0273397   .0072129     3.79   0.000     .0132027    .0414767
          SZ     .0039651    .001195     3.32   0.001     .0016229    .0063072
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(5)      =      57.99
     overall = 0.1090                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1166                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.1083                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                 F(3, 471) =     10.15
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of GEI
. ovtest
                                                   
               Total       237.91     26    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis        28.75      1    0.0000
            Skewness        88.00      5    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity       121.17     20    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
         chi2(20)     =    121.17
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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F test that all u_i=0: F(53, 421) = 42.35                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .81684962   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01298005
     sigma_u    .02741218
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0973905   .0259487    -3.75   0.000    -.1483956   -.0463854
          FS     .0102934   .0037452     2.75   0.006     .0029318     .017655
       INDSO     .0002975   .0006416     0.46   0.643    -.0009637    .0015587
      lnSZSO     .0003752   .0005822     0.64   0.520    -.0007691    .0015196
         IND     .0256102   .0073616     3.48   0.001       .01114    .0400803
          SZ     .0040681    .001221     3.33   0.001     .0016682    .0064681
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0675                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(5,421)          =      10.27
     overall = 0.1062                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1133                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.1087                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS, fe
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1500.49
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0007684       .0277195
                       e     .0001685       .0129801
                     GEI     .0010767       .0328133
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        GEI[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.12, No.8, 2021 
 
44 
                                                                              
         rho    .82016178   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01298005
     sigma_u    .02771949
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0909543   .0200734    -4.53   0.000    -.1302974   -.0516111
          FS     .0093205   .0028849     3.23   0.001     .0036662    .0149748
       INDSO     .0002639   .0006278     0.42   0.674    -.0009665    .0014943
      lnSZSO     .0002846   .0005567     0.51   0.609    -.0008064    .0013757
         IND     .0273397   .0072129     3.79   0.000     .0132027    .0414767
          SZ     .0039651    .001195     3.32   0.001     .0016229    .0063072
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(5)      =      57.99
     overall = 0.1090                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1166                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.1083                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS, re
. est store fe
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         rho    .82016178   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01298005
     sigma_u    .02771949
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0909543   .0384044    -2.37   0.018    -.1662254   -.0156831
          FS     .0093205   .0047221     1.97   0.048     .0000654    .0185756
       INDSO     .0002639    .000896     0.29   0.768    -.0014922      .00202
      lnSZSO     .0002846   .0005554     0.51   0.608     -.000804    .0013732
         IND     .0273397    .019653     1.39   0.164    -.0111795    .0658589
          SZ     .0039651   .0029816     1.33   0.184    -.0018788    .0098089
                                                                              
         GEI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 54 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.1360
                                                Wald chi2(5)      =       8.39
     overall = 0.1090                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1166                                         avg =        8.9
     within  = 0.1083                                         min =          2
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         54
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        480
. xtreg GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS, robust re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8527
                          =        1.97
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
          FS      .0102934     .0093205        .0009729        .0023882
       INDSO      .0002975     .0002639        .0000336        .0001325
      lnSZSO      .0003752     .0002846        .0000906        .0001704
         IND      .0256102     .0273397       -.0017295        .0014724
          SZ      .0040681     .0039651        .0001031        .0002505
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
. est store re
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          FS          580    0.98426      6.054     4.357    0.00001
          SO          580    0.44033    215.252    12.999    0.00000
         IND          580    0.89018     42.239     9.058    0.00000
          SZ          580    0.97153     10.949     5.791    0.00000
         GEI          580    0.86602     51.528     9.539    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk GEI SZ IND SO FS
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      50) =    178.318
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO FS
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      50) =    178.422
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial GEI SZ IND lnSZSO INDSO
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      57) =    586.693
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial GEI SZ IND FS
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      57) =    580.601
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial GEI SZ IND
 
 
